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If there is one thing on which scholars of contemporary Africa agree, it is that 
the continent is, perhaps now more than ever, a difficult place to understand1 
In some of the most prominent studies to emerge in recent years, this is said 
to be true not only for analysts, but for the people who live in Africa, as well. 
As established social and cultural systems are dismantled, as poverty increas-
es, and life expectancy shortens, people across the continent find themselves 
living in a “shadow world” (Ferguson, 2006: 15), a “no man’s land” (see Guyer, 
2011), marked by a “generalized condition of semiotic suspension” (Apter, 2005: 
283) in which words and actions “no longer correspond to the social interweave 
as we tend to conceptualize and experience it” (de Boeck & Plissart, 2004: 34).
In moving quickly through these few descriptions of contemporary Af-
rica – and I have given only a few, it is not hard to find others – I do not wish 
to make light of the fact that the last thirty years have been marked by sig-
nificant suffering for people across the continent. Many of those who live in 
Zambia, the country I know best, have endured considerable hardship as a 
result of the privatization of industry and the shrinking of the welfare state, 
particularly as these have unfolded alongside the AIDS pandemic and the most 
recent global financial crisis. My contention in this paper is therefore not that 
analyses focused on the corrosive effects of “neoliberalism and other social 
diseases” (Richland, 2009) are mistaken in noting that economic change has 






































Man does not only think, he acts. He has not only ideas, but values.
louis dumont
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is the social science that follows from this conclusion. It is one thing to point 
out the confusion that results from weakened social, economic, and political 
institutions; it is quite another to assert that this confusion now takes the 
analytical place once occupied by social organization. 
My goal in this article is to outline a framework for analysis that I believe 
addresses the question of social organization in contemporary Africa more 
thoroughly than many current studies have been able to do, while at the same 
time foregrounding the challenges that the neoliberal period has posed to social 
life on the continent. The central task of this endeavor is highlighting the re-
lational forms that people consider to be most important. More specifically, a 
salient point in studies from the region is that hierarchy is a key aspect of 
social life that has been undermined by liberalization, broadly defined (e.g. 
Ferguson, 2013; Hickel, 2015; Smith, 2007; Haynes & Hickel, 2016; Scherz, 2014). 
I argue that hierarchy is a central social structural form in Southern Africa, and 
probably elsewhere on the continent as well. I also argue that the reason that 
hierarchy is so central is because it is connected to key cultural values, and 
herein lies the theoretical underpinning of my argument. 
In short, the model I am proposing is a reading of urban African social 
life indebted primarily to Louis Dumont (1980, 1983, 1986) and focused on the 
relationship between social forms or structures on the one hand and ideas or 
ideology on the other. I present this approach through an analysis of Pentecos-
tal Christianity on the Zambian Copperbelt. In this article, I will show that 
although Pentecostal believers have a model of how two key religious ideas – 
charisma and prosperity – ought to relate to each other, the circumstances of 
their religious practice make it difficult for them to keep these ideas, and the 
social forms that reflect them, in what they consider to be their proper position. 
The main theoretical problem of this paper is therefore the primary ques-
tion of Dumont’s work as well – namely, as I have just noted, how it is that 
ideas and social structures are related. For Dumont, answering this question 
means starting with ideology, which, at least in his work on India, meant start-
ing with religion. However, for our purposes, what is more important than his 
identification of the ideological with the religious is his emphasis on what he 
calls the “unitary thought” that orders a society (Dumont, 1983: 24). In Dumont’s 
India this is, famously, the opposition of purity and impurity. Dumont puts this 
discussion of ideology alongside an analysis of social structures by showing 
how various social forms are ranked based on their capacity to articulate the 
central ideological tension. Therefore, again taking up his model, the structure 
or social form that best articulates the opposition of purity and impurity is a 
hierarchically-arranged whole, i.e., the caste system. It is because of its rela-
tionship to ideology that the hierarchical whole becomes the most important 
social form in Dumont’s India. 
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This connection between social structures and ideology is made most 
clear in what Dumont calls the “paramount value,” or the “the preeminent 
value by which [a society] is animated” (Dumont, 1986: 231). Dumont only iden-
tifies two paramount values, which he refers to as holism and individualism; 
I am sure that there are others, but his examples will suffice for now. Holism 
is the paramount value in those societies where the whole is the most impor-
tant social form, whereas, unsurprisingly perhaps, individualism is the para-
mount value in those societies where the individual – “the independent, au-
tonomous, and thus essentially non-social moral being” (Dumont, 1986: 25), as 
Dumont nicely puts it – occupies this position. To say that the whole or the 
individual represents the most important social form in a given society is not 
just to say that it is given precedence, as in, for example, the liberal notion that 
the rights of the individual trump those of the group. Rather, the superior posi-
tion given to the social form indicated by the paramount value means that all 
sorts of things – actions, institutions, and ideas – are organized in such a way 
as to promote the production of, for example, individuals or hierarchical wholes 
(see Robbins, 1994). Although the paramount value is therefore related to a 
particular social form, the two are not the same. On the contrary, the paramount 
value is an expression of what a society considers to be most important, the 
articulation of a particular ideological opposition in and with a particular social 
structure. 
So far, we have identified the role of ideology in ordering social forms. 
We have also hinted at the parallel role of these social forms in ordering a range 
of other elements. Lastly, we have situated this process under the umbrella of 
the paramount value. In order to animate all these pieces of the model, it is 
necessary to take an additional step, which brings us to one of the most im-
portant aspects of Dumont’s theory: value. In incorporating this concept into 
my discussion, I have found it helpful to make a distinction between the noun 
“value” or “values” and the verb “to value” (see Haynes, 2017; Haynes & Hickel, 
2016). It is this latter notion that I am interested in here. 
For Dumont, the process of valuing is necessarily relational – that is, 
things are valued in relation to one another. This means that, as he puts it, “to 
adopt a value is to introduce hierarchy” (Dumont 1980: 20). As we have already 
seen, what ranks one social form higher than another is its superior capacity 
to articulate key ideological elements. The process of transforming a set of 
social forms into a ranked order, i.e., valuing them, is therefore worked out in 
terms of ideology. Once this process is in motion, it quickly applies in what we 
might think of as the other direction. That is, the social form that has become 
the most important structures, in turn, ideas, and indeed a whole range of 
cultural elements, including actions, institutions, and practices (Robbins, 2009). 
Social forms are therefore valued in relation to a central ideological opposition 
or framework, a “unitary thought,” while ideas are valued in relation to the 
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social form that best articulates that thought. Incidentally, I think this process 
helps us to see why Dumont offers what feels like such a capacious definition 
of values – note the use of the plural noun – which includes not only ideas, but 
also actions and, indeed, social forms (e.g. “Affinity as a value” (Dumont, 1983)), 
as in his work each of these represents an element ranked in the way I have 
just outlined. 
In Dumont’s theory, then, I think we can treat value as a process that 
applies to all aspects of a society and is worked out at the point of articulation 
between ideology and social forms. My use of the term “articulation” here is 
meant to denote both interconnection and vocalization, as Dumont’s theory of 
social forms reveals – I am tempted to say, “announces” – ideology and vice 
versa. This process is seen most clearly in the paramount value, which repre-
sents a fusion of ideology and social forms, or perhaps more precisely, social 
forms as ideologically significant. Ideology here serves as a starting point, but 
we could debate whether it is always necessary to start there; certainly, we 
should question whether doing so requires us to privilege religion in the way 
that Dumont does in his work on India. In any case, I hope I have made it clear 
that once this process is in motion, the movement is always back and forth, as 
ideas rank social forms, which, in turn, rank ideas. 
I would like to suggest that this intersection, this passing back and forth 
across a point of articulation, represents the great strength of Dumont’s theo-
ry. It is also the reason why I find Dumont to be particularly useful in examin-
ing contemporary African social life, to wit, when we animate his work in this 
way and thus place a strong emphasis on process, we also introduce the pos-
sibility of failure. In other words, even though the organization of social forms 
and ideas reflect each other, either or both of their ranking could be disrupted. 
People may not always achieve the social form they value most; they may not 
always prevent certain ideas from usurping others they consider to be more 
important. This is true in part because of the internal variations always present 
in the systems Dumont describes, as is clear, for example, in his work on what 
he calls “marriage alliance” in South Asia (Dumont, 1983). 
In addition, interference with the ranking of ideas and social forms may 
stem from the fact that, as Marshall Sahlins puts it, “the whole is a part” (see 
Sahlins, 2010). That is, while people have a model of how the elements of their 
society ought to be ranked – what I refer to below as the “social ideal” – this 
model is vulnerable to all sorts of forces emerging from outside their commu-
nity. Here we can include ideas or ideologies, such as Christianity or capitalism 
in the modern West, as Dumont shows in his later work (Dumont 1977, 1986). 
As my discussion of the Zambian Copperbelt will show, disruption of the social 
ideal may also be a result of external forces that act on the other side of our 
model – that is, that challenge the structure of the social form that people 
consider to be most important. 
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This potential for failure in turn necessitates all sorts of social, as well 
as ideological, work – what Achille Mbembe, in a discussion that turns our at-
tention back to contemporary Africa, calls “the labor involved in making life 
possible” (Shipley, 2010: 659). More broadly, then, what this article represents 
is an analysis of people’s efforts to produce a particular kind of social outcome. 
In this way, my discussion fits within what Joel Robbins (2013) has recently 
referred to as “the anthropology of the good,” that is, an anthropology of how 
people work to create what they understand to be a moral, or right, or desirable 
social world. In urban Zambia, this process is bound up with social asymmetry, 
indeed, hierarchy, which is the topic we turn to now. 
MOVING AS THE COPPERBELT PARAMOUNT VALUE
The context for my discussion is a Copperbelt community that I call Nsofu, 
which is a township located on the outskirts of the city of Kitwe. Nsofu is a 
community of approximately 25,000 people. It is densely populated, a mixture 
of privatized company housing and homes built through a government “site 
and service” scheme, some of which are still under construction. It is also an 
economically diverse place. A number of my informants were employed in the 
formal sector, while many others made a living through what is locally glossed 
as “business,” or trade, often informal, in such diverse goods as frilly children’s 
dresses from South Africa, dried fish from Zambia’s Northern Province, or shoes 
from as far away as Dubai. Finally, there are those in Nsofu who have no regu-
lar income and survive on piecework, the good graces of others, or some com-
bination of the two. 
If we were to identify an orienting, “unitary thought” on the Copperbelt, 
I think the strongest candidate is what I have elsewhere called “moving” (Haynes, 
2017). Briefly, moving refers to measurable personal advancement, first and 
foremost in the form of economic status, but also with regard to progress 
through the lifecourse, as well as educational and professional achievement. 
In the view of Pentecostals, moving happens “by the Spirit,” as believers de-
velop with regard to the two key Pentecostal values of charisma and prosper-
ity, which I discuss in more detail below. Moving must be evident to others, who 
find evidence that someone is moving in an expanding waistline, a new suit or 
mobile phone, or a Toyota sedan parked in front of someone’s house (see Guy-
er, 2004: 147). It is important to note that although moving is experienced by 
individual persons or households, it can only come about as a result of social 
relationships. No one moves on her own – indeed, appearing to do so would 
subject a person to accusations of Satanism – but instead advances through 
the assistance provided by a network of relationships.
Mentioning the relational aspects of moving makes it easy to see how 
this idea shapes social structures. People on the Copperbelt move through a 
variety of social ties, but the unifying trait that all these relationships possess 
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is hierarchy, and more specifically socioeconomic hierarchy. Most common here 
are patron-client relationships marked by enduring “dependence” (Ferguson, 
2013). These long-term social bonds link people of higher economic status to 
people of lower economic status, who depend on their patrons for access to 
resources, money, and connections that can help them to move. It is the differ-
ence in status between patrons and clients that makes moving happen in these 
relationships. A connection to a person who is more highly positioned on the 
social ladder enables that person to pull someone up in a way that he could 
not if he were on the same “rung,” so to speak. And the person who is pulled 
up in this way is also pulling someone else along, since ties of dependence 
concatenate to produce long chains through which, at least ideally, everyone 
can move. This stair-stepped social world therefore not only articulates the 
central Copperbelt value of moving, but also provides a condition of its possi-
bility. 
By identifying hierarchical relationships as the most important social 
forms on the Copperbelt, we have made our first pass over the point of articu-
lation that is at the heart of our discussion here. In the remainder of this arti-
cle, I would like to turn this analysis in the opposite direction, moving back 
across the intersection we are examining to explore how social forms, espe-
cially hierarchy, rank other cultural elements, in this case, religious ideas or 
values. Turning this corner of the argument will bring us to some more robust 
ethnography. In what follows we will keep hierarchy in the foreground by ex-
amining how it is worked out among Pentecostal believers in Nsofu. 
PENTECOSTAL ASYMMETRY AND MOVING BY THE SPIRIT
In his study of Ghanaian Pentecostalism, Paul Gifford (2004) writes that the 
believers he observed flocked to pastors known for their spiritual gifts, espe-
cially prophecy and exorcism. It is these religious services, he argues, and not 
the promise of social ties with fellow believers that bring people into Accra’s 
many Pentecostal churches. As Gifford puts it, in these congregations “the links 
are all vertically towards the prophet, rather than horizontally between follow-
ers (Gifford, 2004: 108).” I found a similar pattern in Pentecostal churches in 
Nsofu. Like most neighborhoods in urban Zambia, Nsofu is home to dozens of 
churches, most of which are locally-initiated Pentecostal congregations with 
fewer than 100 members. When asked where they go to church (Mupepa kwi?, 
literally, “Where do you pray?”), many Pentecostal believers would respond the 
way I expected them to, that is, by giving the name of one of these churches: 
Higher Calling, Bethlehem Pentecostal, Power and Glory, and so on. However, I 
found that a significant minority would answer this question not with the name 
of a group, but rather with the name of a pastor, for example, “I pray with Pas-
tor Phiri” (na/kuli Pastor Phiri).
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This preference for identification with a particular leader, rather than a 
Pentecostal congregation, illustrates the importance of a pastor, evangelist, or 
prophet in the religious participation of Nsofu believers. On the Copperbelt, the 
central Pentecostals relational tie is between a layperson and a pastor (see 
Haynes, 2013), an asymmetrical relationship that is often likened to and de-
scribed as the tie between a parent (bafyashi) and a child. The import of this 
relationship is well illustrated in the case of Pastor Ephraim, a church leader 
who became a Pentecostal after a brief period of service in the Methodist Church. 
Pastor Ephraim was known throughout Nsofu as a prophet, and his popularity 
was reflected in the rapid growth of his congregation, Freedom Bible Church. 
Like many Pentecostal churches on the Copperbelt, Freedom Bible Church held 
services in a rented government schoolroom. Each Sunday, believers pack into 
narrow desks for prayer, singing, and preaching; many also attend midweek 
meetings in private homes. Although the congregation had several designated 
leaders, Pastor Ephraim was the one who attracted the most attention, and 
when he did not show up at a midweek prayer meeting, those in attendance 
were visibly disappointed. 
The relationship between Pastor Ephraim and his followers is repre-
sentative of the tie that most Pentecostal leaders on the Copperbelt have to the 
lay members of their churches. Ordinary believers pursue ties with pastors 
because they want to gain access to spiritual services that they hope will solve 
their problems. In this case, the members of Freedom Bible Church expected 
that Pastor Ephraim’s powerful prayer would help them get jobs; his prophetic 
divination would show them if a relative was bewitching them; his skill in 
deliverance would break the demonic powers that kept them from conceiving. 
Testimonies to these various ends circulated widely in Nsofu, fueling Pastor 
Ephraim’s popularity. As a result, more and more people flocked to his meetings 
or to see him in his home for private consultation, hoping that their prayers 
would also be answered because of a connection to this powerful “man of God.”
According to my informants, Pastor Ephraim’s power as a result of divine 
“favor” or “grace”; in what follows, I bring these descriptions together under the 
heading of “charisma.” To a certain extent, my use of this term follows Weber’s 
definition (1946: 245-264): Pastor Ephraim’s power was supernatural, understood 
by Pentecostals to come from the Holy Spirit (umupashi wamushilo). However, 
the difference between people like Pastor Ephraim and ordinary believers is 
one of degree rather than kind, as the divine power that the former display is 
the same as that which is (at least in principle) available to everyone, but has 
been given in greater measure to those who become pastors or prophets. Thus, 
while all believers pray, the prayers of people like Pastor Ephraim are understood 
to be particularly effective; while all believers feel that God sometimes provides 
them with insight or direction, the prophecies of special men of God are deemed 
especially trustworthy. 
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The fact that commitment to a particular pastor follows from a desire 
to address one’s common, everyday problems turns our attention to another 
aspect of Copperbelt Pentecostalism: the prosperity gospel. Also known as the 
“faith gospel” or “health and wealth gospel,” the prosperity gospel is a Christian 
movement, familiar to many in anthropology, that turns on the notion that it 
is God’s will for all believers to be rich, healthy, and successful (see Hunt, 2000 
for a survey). The prosperity gospel has been one of the driving forces behind 
the exponential expansion of Pentecostalism across the Global South, and here 
Zambia is no exception (Cheyeka, 2008). This movement has shaped Christian 
practice throughout the country, influencing both Pentecostal and non-Pente-
costal churches. Despite the unmistakable impact of the prosperity gospel on 
the Copperbelt, however, the teachings of this movement have not been un-
problematically incorporated into local Pentecostal practice.
When I first arrived in Nsofu, I told people that I was especially keen to 
study prosperity gospel churches. Although it was clear that they knew what I 
was referring to by this request, and could often even identify certain pastors 
that they felt fit the prosperity gospel profile, for the most part these were not 
the churches that the believers I spoke to attended. In fact, not only were they 
not part of these congregations, some of these believers spoke of prosperity 
gospel churches with palpable distain. However, although Pentecostals in Nso-
fu were clearly wary of these overt expressions of the prosperity gospel, that 
is, of churches where this teaching represented the main attraction, this did 
not mean that the idea that God wanted Christians to experience material suc-
cess did not figure in believers’ theology. On the contrary, every Pentecostal 
that I met in Nsofu would say that they believed it was God’s will for Christians 
to prosper, and that they expected that eventually this would be true of them. 
All the same, they could not abide congregations where the prosperity gospel 
occupied a central position. 
My informant’s wariness regarding the prosperity gospel puts it in ten-
sion with the charisma we have already seen to be the primary factor in religious 
participation in the Copperbelt. That these two ideas exist in opposition is 
evident in the expectations believers had of their religious leaders. On the one 
hand, Pentecostals thought it appropriate for pastors to display markers of 
material wealth: dressing smartly, carrying thick leather-bound Bibles, and 
wielding high-tech mobile phones. In keeping with this expectation, leaders 
known for their charismatic gifts would sometimes also hold themselves up as 
examples of prosperity. Pastor Ephraim, for instance, was never seen in anything 
other than a crisp shirt and tie, and almost always wore a suit as well. Addition-
ally, in his sermons he would refer to purchases of new clothing or prestige 
goods, including items bought at the Hotel Edinburgh, one of the fancier estab-
lishments in Kitwe.
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Despite the importance of these indexes of success, however, they are 
not by themselves the reason that believers seek to develop relationships with 
preachers and prophets. As we have seen, the attraction of church leaders lies 
first and foremost in their religious skill. Pastors who effectively manage pros-
perity, always keeping it subordinated to charisma, can expect to draw a large 
crowd; those who cannot maintain this balance, but instead allow prosperity 
to get the upper hand, open themselves up to disparaging comments from 
believers, not to mention other pastors. The marginal influence of preachers 
associated primarily with the prosperity gospel is probably why, in the hundreds 
of Pentecostal events I have attended on the Copperbelt over the last decade, I 
have almost never seen a pastor whose preaching and ministry were character-
ized by prosperity alone.
I hope I have made it clear that prosperity and charisma represent two 
key religious ideas among Copperbelt Pentecostals. I also hope that my discus-
sion has shown that Nsofu believers are very concerned with keeping prosper-
ity subordinate to charisma in their churches and, especially, in the visible 
testimony of their leaders. The question remains however, of why it is that one 
of these ideas must rank more highly than the other. Both prosperity and cha-
risma produce hierarchies of success, in the first instance, and spiritual strength, 
in the second. In this way, each of these ideas promotes the social form people 
on the Copperbelt consider to be most important. The issue, then, is how that 
social form pushes back on these ideas. More specifically, if ideas are ranked 
or valued in relation to social structures, that is, if ideas become recognizable 
as values – how does that happen in this case? Responding to this question 
requires us to briefly examine how charisma and prosperity relate to the hier-
archy that we have identified as the most important social form on the Cop-
perbelt, and more specifically how it has been affected by the recent econom-
ic history of the region.
THE PROBLEM WITH PROSPERITY
Over the course of the last three decades, various shocks to the Zambian econo-
my, including the global financial crisis that struck during my doctoral fieldwork 
in 2008 and 2009, have made it difficult for people in communities like Nsofu to 
maintain a social world structured by material status. This is because unemploy-
ment and underemployment push more people toward the bottom of the Cop-
perbelt economic gradient, leaving fewer opportunities for relationships of pro-
ductive dependence, while increasing the risk that hierarchy will be exploitative 
(cf. Ferguson, 2013). These same factors, along with others, like currency devalu-
ations, also make it harder to acquire the prestige goods that serve as key sta-
tus-markers in this system (Haynes, 2012). Taken together, these external influ-
ences put considerable pressure on and sometimes effectively destroy the social 
form that people on the Copperbelt consider to be most important. 
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By itself, the prosperity gospel does not do much to improve this situa-
tion. Even if the attraction of a religious movement that promises wealth is 
obvious, particularly as other mechanisms for economic advancement break 
down, it should also be clear that the prosperity gospel does little to repair the 
damage wreaked by the economic crisis on the economic hierarchy. All the 
prosperity gospel can do is attempt to produce the same structure via super-
natural, rather than market, means (cf. Comaroff & Comaroff, 1999). In contrast 
to prosperity, charisma has the distinct advantage of producing hierarchies 
that do not depend on the market, but are instead a result of ritual life and the 
mysterious work of the Holy Spirit (Haynes, 2015). On the Copperbelt, this means 
that charismatic hierarchy appears to be much more stable than economic 
hierarchy, be it the conventional or the prosperity gospel variety thereof. In 
other words, when it comes to establishing hierarchy, charisma is better at it 
than prosperity. Importantly, charismatic hierarchy also offers analogues of 
dependence and moving, in this case worked out in terms of religious assistance 
and aspiration. The details of these ideas are discussed elsewhere (see Haynes, 
2017: 57-73), yet the example of leaders like Pastor Ephraim provide enough of 
a sense of religious dependence. 
My aim in highlighting the social importance of charismatic asymmetry 
for Nsofu believers is to draw attention to the way that key social forms order 
ideas. Again, these are the social forms that people value most and represent 
local notions of a good society. In this case, the importance of hierarchy on the 
Copperbelt means that that charisma, which makes better hierarchies than 
prosperity, is the more highly ranked of the two ideas. The fact that hierarchy 
structures the relative positions of charisma and prosperity among Copperbelt 
Pentecostals does not, however, mean that believers are always successful in 
keeping these ideas in what they would consider to be their proper order. Rath-
er, there are several points at which this process can and does break down, a 
brief outline of a few of these is provided below. 
One of the most serious threats to ranking charisma above prosperity is 
found in the theological structure of the latter. As mentioned earlier, the central 
tenet of the prosperity gospel is that Christians should be wealthy. The way 
that followers of the prosperity gospel are supposed to access divine blessings 
is through displays of faith – giving gifts, especially when they can’t afford to, 
or telling family and friends that something they are hoping for will happen, 
even if they cannot be sure that it will. God is then expected to act in keeping 
with (ukulingana) a believer’s faith; in the words of the New Testament, “He who 
sows sparingly will also reap sparingly, he who sows generously will also reap 
generously” (2 Corinthians 9: 6). Great faith – that is, great spiritual strength – is 
said to produce a great earthly reward. The troubling aspect of all of this for 
Copperbelt Pentecostals is not difficult to see: in the framework of the prosper-
ity gospel, charisma and prosperity are one in the same thing. While, as we 
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have seen, believers want charisma to rank higher than prosperity, the religious 
mechanisms of the prosperity gospel continually undermine the ordering of 
these ideas. In addition to these theological problems, Pentecostals are also 
faced with the fact that church leaders rely on laypeople for economic support 
and are therefore often forced to be rather strategic in the relationships they 
form among ordinary believers (Haynes, 2015). I won’t go into the specifics of 
this problem here, but suffice it to say that when the primary site of charis-
matic hierarchy, the tie between leaders and laypeople, is affected by econom-
ic concerns, it becomes very difficult for believers to tell whether their pastors 
and co-parishioners have kept charisma in the right place relative to material 
prosperity.
Faced with these problems, it is not surprising that when leaders demon-
strate only charisma without any emphasis on prosperity, they very quickly at-
tract a large following. In the case of a young prophet who rose to prominence 
just before I left the field in 2009, the overwhelming presence of charisma in his 
ministry made the group that gathered around him something of an island of 
clarity in the ongoing conflict between charisma and prosperity. I first hear 
of this prophet from several informants who had visited his meetings or, in 
some cases, been given reports of his powerful ministry by their Pentecostal 
friends. Those who had not yet gone to see him were anxious to do so, and when 
a few informants planned a visit I jumped at the chance to tag along. We had 
been told that because of the prophet’s popularity we should arrive very early at 
the home where his followers met if we wanted to see him. This home was lo-
cated in a community a short distance from Nsofu, a township comprised of 
dozens of identical white bungalows that had once been employee accommoda-
tion for the mine power company. While it might have been difficult to find one 
house among so many that looked alike, we had no trouble locating our destina-
tion. From far up the street we could hear the unmistakable sound of Pentecostal 
prayer as believers raised their voices in dozens of individual petitions. As we 
drew closer we could see a number of women crowded at the windows and doors 
of a house bursting at the seams; still others had found seats on the grass, their 
heads shielded from the sun by spare citenge wrap skirts or blankets that a few 
hours earlier had swaddled babies against the morning chill (Figure 1). Because 
the prophet’s services were in such high demand, the believers who hosted the 
meeting had devised a system to help ensure that all those who wished to meet 
with him privately would be able to do so. A small box had been filled with card-
board squares, each marked with a number. Different days of the week were 
allocated to each of the surrounding townships and on the designated day resi-
dents of those communities were invited to take a number and wait their turn 
for individual consultations (Figure 2).
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Despite his obvious popularity, the humility of this prophet was evident 
in many ways. First, rather than employ a title such as Pastor, Prophet, or Evan-
gelist, a practice common among up-and-coming Pentecostal leaders, he was 
instead known by the simple teknonym of Bashi Jethro. Where others would 
have taken care to be smartly dressed in a suit or trendy jeans, Bashi Jethro 
wore a T-shirt and loose trousers. Unlike other church leaders, who occasion-
ally received believers in their homes, Bashi Jethro preached in the sitting room 
of a local widow. This suggested that his house was not large or well furnished 
enough for him to receive guests, and that he was therefore dependent on oth-
ers’ wealth for his ministry. Despite these markers of humility and low mate-
rial status, the power Bashi Jethro displayed in casting out demons and, I was 
told, in divining spiritual problems during private consultation, was unmistak-
able to believers. In other words, Bashi Jethro’s authority was one based on 
charisma alone, without any accompanying markers of prosperity. 
I mention Bashi Jethro here primarily to offer one final illustration of 
the importance of charisma for Copperbelt Pentecostals. During my fieldwork, 
leaders like Bashi Jethro would appear periodically and in a short time amass 
a large following, which meant that every so often I would find myself with 
others crowding into a sitting room with several dozen believers, all of them 
hoping to meet with the new pastor individually. I would argue that the reason 
figures like Bashi Jethro are so popular is because they represent pure charisma. 
While leaders that represent prosperity alone are objects of scorn, those who 
stand for pure charisma are revered by all believers. This, I think, is because 
these charismatic figures perform a reorienting function: in the ongoing ten-
sion between charisma and prosperity, they offer a clear statement of which 
idea is the more important (Robbins, 2015).
Although figures like Bashi Jethro appear on the Nsofu religious scene 
from time to time, and their presence sheds further light on the relative im-
portance of charisma and prosperity on the Copperbelt, I must emphasize that 
they are the exception, rather than the rule. Most pastors and believers are 
trying to balance both charisma and prosperity. Moreover, I would argue that 
the interplay between these two ideas is the hallmark of Pentecostalism in 
urban Zambia. People have not abandoned prosperity completely, although, as 
we will see, they have taken steps to reshape it. I think there are several reasons 
for the ongoing influence of prosperity on the Copperbelt. For one thing, people 
would like prosperity; more specifically, they would like the kind of prosperity 
that would create a stable material hierarchy within which they could make 
moving happen. It stands to reason, then, that if the prosperity gospel were 
better at making good on its promises, believers would not worry so much about 
keeping it subordinate to charisma. Together, the possibility that prosperity 
could rank higher than charisma if it made better hierarchies and the fact that 
this has not happened, point to the centrality, indeed, the ordering force, of 
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hierarchy in urban Zambia. Thus, while people certainly want prosperity, this 
is only true provided it does not come at the expense of the social forms they 
consider to be most important. This, then, is what I have in mind when I say 
that social forms structure, rank, and ultimately value ideas. 
By showing that Pentecostals on the Copperbelt have an ideal model of 
how social forms and ideas ought to relate to each other, I put forward an ap-
proach to this model through an analysis of each of these types of elements. 
Finally, my analysis demonstrates that the process of bringing social life in line 
with this model can break down. In closing, I would like to return briefly to the 
issue of breakdown to respond to the reports of chaotic Africa with which I 
opened my discussion. 
CONCLUSION: ON THE “DELIBERATE LABOR” OF MAKING LIFE POSSIBLE
On one level, my analysis of the Copperbelt has pointed to the same sorts of 
conclusions reached by those who see contemporary Africa as a place where, 
to quote James Ferguson, “much is unknown, hard to make out, perhaps even 
unknowable” (Ferguson, 2006: 15-16). We have seen in the foregoing discussion 
how the instability that has followed economic crisis and structural adjustment 
has eroded a key social form, in this case, socioeconomic hierarchy. Insofar as 
this is the case, we could say that the Copperbelt has indeed become a difficult 
place for people to live as they wished. This does not, however, mean that it is 
a difficult place for them to understand. By showing how the social forms they 
consider to be most important are tied up in an ongoing process of ranking, or 
of valuation involving a whole range of ideas and, as in the case of the church, 
institutions, we can see that the social and relational challenges of late capital-
ism are not the end of the story. Rather, what the example of Nsofu demon-
strates is that Pentecostals are involved in an ongoing process of social and 
ideological work, to invoke Mbembe again, the “deliberate labor” of everyday 
life (Shipley, 2010: 657).
In closing, allow me to give just two brief examples that illustrate this 
kind of labor, one from each axis of the model I have been working with here. 
First, ideological work. In the case of Copperbelt Pentecostalism, prosperity has 
undergone some significant redefinition when compared to its transnational 
counterparts (cf. Haynes, 2012). Believers in Nsofu have, over time, developed 
what some of them described in English as a “holistic” understanding of pros-
perity – one that includes spiritual growth and strong family ties alongside 
material wellbeing. Although I am sure that this retooling of the prosperity 
gospel has in part followed from the simple fact that it does not work the way 
its proponents say it will, when considering it in the context of the relationship 
that Pentecostal practice has to hierarchy, I think we can safely say that these 
changes also represent ideological work on the part of people who are trying 
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to create a certain kind of social world. If prosperity could be indexed by things 
other than material goods, then perhaps it could be made to produce hierarchies 
that do not depend on the market. As the foregoing discussion suggests, I do 
not think the prosperity gospel has been made to serve this purpose, at least 
not yet; I do think, however, that we can understand the retooling of its mes-
sage as an instance of ideological work shaped by the local arrangement of 
values. 
Secondly, I’d like to consider work with regard to social forms. Here we 
might include the way that Pentecostals try to protect relationships between 
church leaders and laypeople from being unduly influenced by economic con-
cerns. One example of this from my fieldwork was the incredible lengths that 
a group of lay leaders went to in order to keep their pastor from knowing how 
much money different members of the church had contributed toward a large 
gift given to her on the occasion of her “kitchen mending” party (see Haynes, 
2017, chapter 7). When efforts such as these fail, and often they do, believers 
continue to engage in the relational work of protecting charismatic hierarchy 
by voting with their feet, that is, by leaving churches they perceive as having 
been compromised and joining congregations that appear to value charisma 
over prosperity in their relational framework. Taken together, these actions 
represent the social work of people on the Copperbelt to protect the social form 
they consider to be most important.
While the type of analysis I have outlined here highlights the challeng-
es of contemporary Africa, I hope that I have also shown that doing so requires 
more than a simple acknowledgement that economic liberalization, let alone 
any of the other features of neoliberalism, makes it difficult for people to live 
out their social lives in the same way they always have. By pulling out the in-
terrelated ideas and social forms that together make up local notions of a good 
society, we are able to see not only those points where these notions fail to 
match up with reality, but more importantly the continued salience of these 
notions and the deliberate labor in which people across the continent are en-
gaged in order to bring them about. This Dumontian framework represents a 
particularly helpful way of approaching contemporary Africa, by acknowledging 
that ours is a challenging time, but not reducing our time to these challenges. 
Received on 27/12/2016 | Revised on 24/4/2017 | Approved on 30/4/2017
730





































Naomi Haynes received her PhD in 2012 from the 
University of California, San Diego and is currently a Chancellor’s 
Fellow in Social Anthropology at the University of Edinburgh. Her 
research interests include the Anthropology of Christianity, 
political economy, exchange, gender, hierarchy, and value. Her 
monograph, Moving by the Spirit (University of California Press), 
explores the social life of Pentecostal congregations on the 
Zambia Copperbelt, paying special attention to the opportunities 
and struggles associated with spiritual patronage. She has 
recently begun a new research project on Christian nationalism, 
which brings together political philosophy, media studies, and 
congregational ethnography to explore Zambia’s constitutional 
declaration that it is a “Christian nation.”
 NOTE
1  An earlier version of this paper was presented in the social 
anthropology department seminar at the University of 
Edinburgh. Thanks to seminar participants, in particular 
Jonathan Spencer, for their engagement with the paper. 
Thanks also to Joel Robbins for his feedback on earlier 
drafts. Any shortcomings in the f inal version are ulti-
mately my own. My research has been funded by the 
Wenner-Gren Foundation, a Fulbright-Hayes Doctoral Dis-
sertation Research Abroad grant, the British Academy, and 
the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland. Thanks 
to these organizations for their invaluable support.
731
article | naomi haynes
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Apter, Andrew H. (2005). The Pan-African nation: oil and the 
spectacle of culture in Nigeria. Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press.
Cheyeka, Austin M. (2008). Toward a history of the Charis-
matic churches in post-colonial Zambia. In: Gewald, J.-B.; 
Hinfelaar, M. & Macola, G. (eds.). One Zambia, many histories: 
towards a history of post-colonial Zambia. Leiden: Brill.
Comaroff, Jean & Comaroff, John. (1999). Occult economies 
and the violence of abstraction: notes from the South 
African postcolony. American Ethnologist, 26/2, p. 279-303.
de Boeck, Filip & Plissart, Marie-Françoise. (2004). Kin-
shasa: tales of the invisible city. Ghent: Ludion.
Dumont, Louis. (1986). Essays on individualism: modern ide-
ology in anthropological perspective. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Dumont, Louis. (1983). Affinity as a value: marriage alliance 
in South India, with comparative essays on Australia. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Dumont, Louis. (1980). Homo hierarchicus: the caste system 
and its implications. Complete rev. English ed. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press. 
Dumont, Louis. (1977). From Mandeville to Marx: the genesis 
and triumph of economic ideology. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Ferguson, James. (2013). Declarations of Dependence: La-
bor, Personhood, and Welfare in Southern Africa. Journal 
of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 19/2, p. 223-242.
Ferguson, James. (2006). Global shadows : Africa in the neo-
liberal world order. Durham N.C.: Duke University Press.
Gifford, Paul. (2004). Ghana’s new Christianity: Pentecostal-
ism in a globalizing African economy. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press.
Guyer, Jane I. (2011). Describing urban ‘no man’s land’ in 
Africa. Africa, 81/3, p. 474-492.
Guyer, Jane I. (2004). Marginal gains : monetary transactions 
in Atlantic Africa, The Lewis Henry Morgan lectures. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
732





































Haynes, Naomi. (2017). Moving by the Spirit: Pentecostal so-
cial life on the Zambian Copperbelt. Berkeley: University of 
California Press.
Haynes, Naomi. (2015). Egalitarianism and hierarchy in 
Copperbelt religious practice: on the social work of Pen-
tecostal ritual. Religion, 45/2, p. 273-292.
Haynes, Naomi. (2013). On the Potential and Problems of 
Pentecostal Exchange. American Anthropologist, 115/1, p. 85-95.
Haynes, Naomi. (2012). Pentecostalism and the morality 
of money: prosperity, inequality, and religious sociality 
on the Zambian Copperbelt. Journal of the Royal Anthropo-
logical Institute, 18/1, p. 123-139.
Haynes, Naomi & Hickel, Jason. (2016). Introduction: hi-
erarchy, values, and the value of hierarchy. Social Analysis 
60/4, p. 1-20.
Hickel, Jason. (2015). Democracy as social death: the making 
of anti-liberal politics in neoliberal South Africa. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Hunt, Stephen. (2000). ‘Winning ways’: globalisation and 
the impact of the health and wealth gospel. Journal of Con-
temporary Religion, 15/3, p. 331-347.
Richland, Justin B. (2009). On neoliberalism and other 
social diseases: the 2008 sociocultural Anthropology year 
in review. American anthropologist, 111/2, p. 170-176.
Robbins, Joel. (2017). Ritual, value, and example: on the 
perfection of cultural representations. Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute,  21/S1, p. 18-29.
Robbins, Joel. (2013). Beyond the suffering subject: toward 
an anthropology of the good. Journal of the Royal Anthro-
pological Institute 19/3, p. 447-462.
Robbins, Joel. (2009). Conversion, hierarchy, and cultural 
change: value and syncretism in the globalization of Pen-
tecostal and Charismatic Christianity. In: Rio, K. M. & 
Smedal, O. H. (eds.). Hierarchy: persistence and transforma-
tion in social formations. New York: Berghahn Books.
Robbins, Joel. (1994). Equality as a value: ideology in Du-
mont, Melanesia, and the West. Social Analysis, 36, p. 21-70.
Sahlins, Marshall. (2010). The whole is a part: intercul-
tural politics of order and change. In: Otto, T. & Bubandt, 
733
article | naomi haynes
N. (eds.). Experiments in holism: theory and practice in con-
temporary anthropology. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Scherz, China. (2014). Having people, having heart: charity, 
sustainable development, and problems of dependence in Central 
Uganda. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Shipley, Jesse Weaver. (2010). Africa in theory: A conver-
sation between Jean Comaroff and Achille Mbembe. An-
thropological Quarterly, 83/3, p. 653-678.
Smith, Daniel Jordan. (2007). A culture of corruption : eve-
ryday deception and popular discontent in Nigeria. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
Weber, Max. (1946). From Max Weber: essays in sociology. 
Translated by H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills. New York: Ox-
ford University Press.
734

















































A ÁFRICA CONTEMPORÂNEA NA PERSPECTIVA 
DE LOUIS DUMONT
Resumo
Este artigo responde a uma tendência dos estudos antro-
pológicos recentes na África de enfatizar em demasia a 
carência de organização social como decorrente do avanço 
das reformas neoliberais no continente. Fazendo uso de 
um aparato teórico informado pela teoria de Louis Dumont, 
demonstro como a organização social continua a ser um 
tópico analítico importante em tempos de crise – e que 
isso é mais bem percebido por meio de uma análise dos 
valores. O foco etnográfico é o cristianismo pentecostal tal 
como praticado no Cinturão do Cobre da Zâmbia. Nesse 
contexto africano específico, o pentecostalismo é animado 
por um valor abrangente que chamo de “avanço” (moving), 
que abriga dois subvalores: carisma e prosperidade. A aná-
lise do modo como os crentes pentecostais lidam com a 
relação hierárquica entre esses dois subvalores permite 
uma visão mais clara do mundo social que a adesão ao 
pentecostalismo torna possível. 
CONTEMPORARY AFRICA THROUGH THE 
THEORY OF LOUIS DUMONT
Abstract
This article responds to a trend in recent anthropological 
scholarship in Africa that has overemphasized a lack of 
social organization following the advancement of neolib-
eral reforms across the continent. Using a theoretical 
framework informed by the theory of Louis Dumont, I show 
that social organization remains an important analytical 
topic in times of crisis, and that this is best apprehended 
through an analysis of values. The ethnographic focus of 
this article is Pentecostal Christianity as it is practiced on 
the Zambian Copperbelt. In this particular African context, 
Pentecostalism is animated by an overarching value that I 
call “moving,” which is in turn made up to two sub-values: 
charisma and prosperity. By exploring how Pentecostal be-
lievers navigate the hierarchical relationship between 
these two sub-values, we are given a clear picture of the 
social world that Pentecostal adherence makes possible.
